Introduction
In the 1970s and 1980s environmental policies in industrialised countries were mainly based on traditional command-and-control approaches. The end of the 1980s saw a surge of interest in economic instruments. In 1987 the report of the World Commission for Environment and Development emphasised their role in environmental policy. In the context of the European Communities the new interest in economic instruments was amplified by the Commission's Task Force Report on the environment and the internal market, the European Parliaments hearing on economic instruments in June 1990 as well as the decision in Rome by the environment council in September 1990 to develop a proposal for a European carbon-energy tax. In 1993 the Delor's White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment highlighted the possible positive macro-economic implications of such an environmental policy: switching taxation from goods (labour) to bads (pollutants) would increase labour demand and reduce European unemployment level.
Since then, labour and environment policies and their connection with growth have been under increasing scrutiny, and a vast literature has emerged around the idea of a possible "double-dividend": a first dividend in terms of reduction of environmental pollution and a second dividend in terms or welfare improvement from reduction of existing distortionary taxes 1 . The recent debate on double dividend can be roughly divided in two strands (Bosello et al, 1998) . A first strand has emphasised individual welfare or utility, derived from consumption, leisure and environmental quality, with less attention paid to the specific modes in which the environmental tax revenues are recycled and their consequences on the economy. The focus is on distortion before and after the tax reform: one of the main theoretical conclusions is that a double dividend does not really exist. This is due to the fact that the new distortions introduced by the green taxes will normally be larger than the pre-existing fiscal distortion offset by the green taxes revenues.
2
A second strand of research has emphasised the impact that recycled fiscal revenues could have on relevant macroeconomic variables, such as output and employment. Some analysts have studied the potential impact that labour and environmental may have on the potential growth of developing countries. 3 In Europe, given the high level of taxation on labour and the high persistent unemployment, the debate has concentrated upon the existence of a so-called "employment double dividend", i.e. the possibility of achieving better environmental quality by taxing pollutants and lower unemployment rates by using green tax revenues to lower taxes on labour, the high level of those often being perceived as one of the causes of high unemployment rates (Daveri and Tabellini, 2000) .
Our paper analyses this second issue not by extending our knowledge of which are the special conditions to get the double dividend, but rather by empirically measuring the potential interactions between environmental and labour policies. In fact, in the theoretical literature the double dividend is measured in welfare terms, so that only if some aggregate welfare measure shows positive increases due to the introduction of an environmental policy, a double dividend can be established. Policy makers though may be more interested in knowing which are the distributive effects of the environmental policy, what its consequences in terms of employment and potential growth. Aggregate welfare may be slightly reduced by introducing a green tax even when its revenues are recycled to reduce other distortionary taxes, but employment may be increased and the final allocation of the fiscal burden better distributed among the economic agents. This may eventually expand economic growth and make the environmental taxation a more sustainable policy, clearly a double dividend from a policy maker point of view.
Additionally, in this paper, we try to measure the potential interactions between green taxes on a variety of pollutants, overcoming a weakness of previous research that only considered taxes on an idealised theoretical pollutant or on carbon (Pezzey and Park, 1998; Bosello et al, 1998) . The debate has also shown that political feasibility of introducing green taxes crucially depends on the sectoral disaggregation of the impact. The disaggregation in 39 sectors of our model allows for an analysis of the sectoral impact of green tax reforms, often neglected by the double-dividend literature.
Initially, in our model, we consider abatement policies alone, holding other policies parameters constant, and measure their effects on growth, sectoral resource allocation and employment. An important result is that the cost in terms of growth of abating emissions is marginal, and that targeting one type of emission de facto reduces all the others pollutants. Then in a second stage, we combine environmental and labour policies and show how they may interact. It is shown that recycling green taxes revenues to reduce taxes on labour further reduces the costs of achieving pollution reduction targets.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the most important features of the model. Section 3 succinctly presents the Italian environmental and employment situation, and briefly surveys previous studies on the possible implementation of ecological tax reforms. Section 4 illustrates the model benchmark scenario, where no economic policy is altered. Against it, scenarios of alternative environmental and labour policies are contrasted in section 5. The final section summarises the main conclusions.
The model
The model used in this paper is fully described in a technical appendix and is calibrated on data contained in the Social Accounting Matrix estimated for the year 1990, described in detail elsewhere. The version of the SAM used here includes 10 household categories, 39 sectors, 2 labour types, separated trading partners and 13 different polluting emissions. 4 The model is dynamic and solved recursively for the period 1990-2010. The following sub-sections briefly illustrate the model's main characteristics.
Production The Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) constant returns to scale production function is a nested structure taking into account the assumed substitution possibilities in the choice of production factors. Output results from two composite goods: non-energy intermediates and energy plus value added. The intermediate aggregate is obtained combining all products in fixed proportions (Leontief structure). The value added and energy components are decomposed in two parts: aggregate labour and capital, which includes energy. Labour is a composite of 2 categories. The capital-energy bundle is further disaggregated into its basic components.
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By distinguishing between "new" and "old" vintages, the capital existing at the beginning of each period, or already installed, can be separated from that resulting from contemporary investment (putty/semi-putty production function). 6 Finally, the energy aggregate includes two energy substitutes: oil and electricity. Figure 2 -1 depicts the nested decision process in the choice of production factors. 
Skilled Unskilled Employer
-CES substitution elasticities are differentiated by capital vintage, new capital (higher) elasticities are shown to the right of the comma.
-No substitution is possible among intermediates. Domestic products can be substituted with the corresponding foreign ones.
Substitution elasticities reflect adjustment possibilities in the demand for factors of production originating from variations in their relative prices. Consider particular values 7 : 0.00 between intermediates and value added with old capital plus energy; 0.50 between 5 The particular production function of this model treats energy as a separate factor of production rather than an intermediate input. Energy use is typically highly polluting and the specific nesting structure adopted here allows monitoring more closely energy-related emissions. Moreover bundling energy together with capital is motivated by the fact that new technologies, embodied in new capital goods, are usually energy saving (i.e. energy substituting). 6 In the short run capital is usually sector-specific, whereas in the long run it can be perfectly mobile across sectors. The "vintages" approach allows integrating in the present dynamic model both short run capital immobility and long run capital mobility. In the modelled economy new capital (equal to the previous period's level of investment) is perfectly mobile and old capital only partially mobile across sectors. Another advantage of the "vintages" approach is that it allows introducing different degrees of substitutability of capital with other factors. In fact, old capital vintage is less substitutable with energy, labour and other inputs than new capital. Both these features add realism to this environment model where increased investment opportunities and new capital goods should embody cleaner technologies and greater adjustment possibilities. 7 These elasticities are derived from the most recent relevant literature. In fact, they are mostly derived from background studies done for the construction of the OECD GREEN model. See for instance Burniaux, Nicoletti and Oliveira-Martins (1992). intermediates and value added aggregate incorporating new capital plus energy; 0.12 between aggregate labour and old capital-energy bundle; 1.00 between aggregate labour and new capital-energy bundle; 0.40 among different types of labour; 0.00 between old capital and energy; 0.80 between new capital and energy; 0.25 among different sources of energy associated with old capital; 2.00 among those associated with new capital.
Income Distribution and Absorption
Labour income is allocated to households according to a fixed coefficient distribution matrix derived from the original SAM. Likewise capital revenues are distributed among households, corporations and rest of the world. Corporations save the after-tax residual of that revenue.
Private consumption demand is obtained through maximisation of household specific utility function following the Extended Linear Expenditure System (ELES).
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Household utility is a function of consumption of different goods and saving. Income elasticities are different for each household and product and vary in the range 0.20, for basic products consumed by the household with highest income, to 1.30 for services.
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Once their total value is determined, government and investment demands 10 are disaggregated in sectoral demands according to fixed coefficient functions.
International Trade
In the model we assume imperfect substitution among goods originating in different geographical areas.
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Imports demand results from a CES aggregation function of domestic and imported goods. Export supply is symmetrically modelled as a Constant Elasticity of Transformation (CET) function. Producers decide to allocate their output to domestic or foreign markets responding to relative prices. The model implements a two-stage procedure for determining both import demand and export supply. For imports consider Figure 2 -2. At the first stage aggregate 8 A useful reference for the ELES approach is found in Lluch (1973) . More detailed explanations of this modelling choice are given in the technical appendix. 9 Among the various sources for these elasticities see Blanciforti and Green (1983) , Eastwood and Craven (1981) , Lopez (1989) and Maki (1988) . 10 Aggregate investment is set equal to aggregate savings, while aggregate government expenditures are exogenously fixed. 11 Armington (1969). demand is decomposed into a domestic component and an aggregate import component. At the second stage, aggregate import demand is allocated across the various trading partners.
Export supply is treated in a symmetric fashion (see Figure 2- As Italy is unable to influence world prices the small country assumption holds, and its imports and exports prices are treated as exogenous. The balance of payments equilibrium is determined by the equality of foreign savings (which are exogenous) to the value for the current account. With fixed world prices and capital inflows, all adjustments are accommodated by changes in the real exchange rate: increased import demand, due to trade liberalisation must be financed by increased exports, and these can expand owing to the improved resource allocation. Price decreases in importables drive resources towards export sectors and contribute to falling domestic resource costs (or real exchange rate depreciation).
Model Closure and Dynamics
The equilibrium condition on the balance of payments is combined with other closure conditions so that the model can be solved for each period. Firstly consider the government budget. Its surplus 13 is fixed and the household income tax schedule shifts in order to achieve the predetermined net government position. Secondly, investment must equal savings, which originate from households, corporations, government and rest of the world.
The dynamic structure of the model results from the equilibrium condition between savings and investment. A change in the savings volume influences capital accumulation in the following period. Exogenously determined growth rates are assumed for various 12 Elasticities between domestic and foreign products are of comparable magnitude for imports demand and exports supply. Their values are 3.00 for agricultural goods, 2.00 for manufactured goods and 1.50 for services. Similar values are used for the second nesting. 13 Its initial value is determined in the 1990 SAM.
other factors that affect the growth path of the economy, such as: population and labour supply growth rates, labour and capital productivity growth rates and energy efficiency factor growth rate. Agents are assumed to be myopic and to base their decisions on static expectations about prices and quantities. The model dynamics are therefore recursive, generating a sequence of static equilibria.
Emissions Emissions are determined by either intermediate or final 14 consumption of polluting products. In addition, certain industries display an autonomous emission component linked directly to their output levels. This is introduced in order to include some polluting production processes that would not be accounted for by only considering the vectors of their intermediates consumption. It is assumed that labour and capital do not pollute. Emissions coefficients associated with each type of consumption and production are derived from a previous study 15 on the determinants of polluting intensity for the US and here adapted to the Italian case. A change in sectoral output, or in consumption vectors, both in levels or composition, therefore affects emission volumes. Formally, the total value for a given polluting emission takes the form:
where i is the sector index, j the consumed product index, C intermediate consumption, X Output output, X Armington final consumption (at the Armington composite goods level), α j the emission volume associated with one unit consumption of product j and β i the emission volume associated with one unit production of sector i. Thus, the first two elements of the right hand side expression represent production-generated emissions, the third one consumption-generated emissions.
There are 13 types of polluting substances. Their volume is independently determined and measured in metric tons. Toxic emissions in air (TOXAIR), water (TOXWAT) and soil (TOXSOL) depend primarily on the consumption of chemicals (especially fertilisers for water pollution), oil derived products and mineral products. Bio-accumulative emissions differ from the previous ones for their long term effects on bio organisms, due to their high lead (or other heavy metal) concentration. Again, these are distinguished according to the medium where they are released: into the air (BIOAIR), water (BIOWAT) and soil (BIOSOL). These emissions are a result of the use of mineral and metal products, generally found in construction-related sectors. There are 5 types of toxic substances released in the air: sulphur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen dioxide (NO2) and carbon monoxide (CO), volatile organic compounds (VOC) and suspended particulates (PART). Their levels depend primarily on fuels consumption: oil and coal derived products. Finally, two additional categories of water polluting substances are considered:
14 Final consumption, in this context, is restricted to households, government and investment demand. Exports are not considered since the analysis is limited to local emission. 15 See Dessus, Roland-Holst, van der Mensbrugghe (1994) . Instead of focusing on pollution output at individual industrial sources, they advocate moving back up the production process. Factories producing pollution can be numerous and very dispersed geographically. The evidence reported in their study indicates that only a few commodities are responsible for determining pollution levels when they are consumed as intermediates. Their econometric estimates indicate that over 90 per cent of the variation in emission of most toxic pollution can be explained by consumption of less than a dozen intermediate commodities. Their calculations are based on a 345 sector US input-output table (see Reinert and Roland-Holst (1992) ) and on the 1987 IPPS (Industrial Pollution Projection System) database developed at the World Bank for the US (Hettige, Martin, Singh, Wheeler (1994) ). suspended solids (SS) and those measured by their biochemical oxygen demand (BOD). These emissions are related to the consumption of mineral products.
The household utility functions do not include among their arguments any term directly related to environmental qualities. In other words, pollution levels are assumed not to explicitly affect household utility. Despite the theoretical validity of the utilityenvironment relationship, empirical applications would require estimates for utility values that household assign to environmental qualities. Unfortunately statistical information on which these estimates can be based is still too limited. 16 Likewise, environmental degradation is not assumed to affect production factors productivity. Productivity gains resulting from new investments in greener technology are not measured in this model. Thus, the potential gains from environmental protection policies are almost certainly going to be under-estimated.
Policy Instruments
The model includes a variety of important instruments of economic policy: direct and indirect taxes on production, consumption and revenues, tariffs and other taxes and subsidies on international transactions. Each of these taxes/subsidies is differentiated by sector, product, household, production factor, consumption type or income source. A uniform tax on each unit of polluting emission (for type of toxic substance) is also introduced and paid by the polluter agents. This tax can be endogenously determined if specified levels of emission (abatement) are to be targeted, otherwise it can be exogenously fixed. In this latter case, emissions levels become endogenous.
Economic Activity and Environment in Italy
Several reasons make Italy an especially instructive case study for the introduction of a comprehensive green fiscal reform.
Italy shows a relatively high-energy efficiency. Energy supply per unit of GDP is the lowest across OECD countries. As a result, energy-related emission (such as CO 2 and SO 2 ) shows emission intensity lower than OECD average 17 . The relative high-energy efficiency of Italy makes standard command-and-control measures extremely costly. Economic instruments, such as green taxes, are likely to be more effective.
Italy could benefit substantially from the introduction of economic instruments also to cope with other pollutants, where Italy scores relatively badly:
-despite relatively high energy efficiency, NOx emission per unit of GDP are higher in Italy than OECD average. This is mainly due to high road vehicle. This also contributes to increase pollution in urban areas from PM 10 and O 3 ;
-the intensity of use of nitrogen and phosphate in agriculture is among the highest across OECD countries, but actually lower than in most EU countries.
Italy shows higher unemployment rates and lower growth of employment than most OECD countries 18 . Besides, employment levels declined from 1990 to 1998 at a rate of 0.5% pa, compared with a decline across EU countries of only 0.1% pa and an increase across OECD countries of around 0.7% pa. The design of effective policies to reduce unemployment rates and increase the creation of jobs is a high priority in the political agenda and a real national urgency.
Italian labour market bears a higher rate of taxation on labour than in most OECD countries. Including income tax, the total wage gap (difference between net wages perceived by the employees and total costs incurred by employers was just below 45%, the highest in Europe after Denmark and Finland (higher than Sweden) 19 . Reduction of labour costs through reduction of taxation on labour fits into the political agenda of reducing unemployment rate. The implementation of a green tax reform would permit to achieve the objective at no cost for the government budget.
There is still substantial scope for the introduction of economic instruments in environmental policy. The Ministry of Environment (1997) identified ten environmental taxes and six taxes on energy and automobiles (see Table 8 -3 in the Appendix). Revenues from those taxes are relatively small. Environmental taxes in 1994 only yielded around 0.3% of GDP. More recently, some taxes with explicit environmental aims have been introduced. A carbon tax was introduced in 1998. The tax took the form of an increase of the existing excise duties on fuels and it is differentiated by fuel type. Expected revenues were Euro 1.0 bn in 1999 and were partially recycled through reduction of taxes on labour incomes. However, the application of the tax was suspended during 1999 to accomodate the increase in world oil prices. Suspension has been subsequently reiterated. In January 1999 it was also introduced a new tax on SO2 and NOx emissions for big combustion plants (power bigger than 50MW). The rate is at Euro 195 per ton per year for SO2 and Euro 53.12 per ton per year for NOx. International comparisons are difficult of differences in tax bases, tax exemptions, tax scope etc.. However, these rates appear considerably smaller than those applied, for example, in Sweden where the tax rate on SO2 is 3650 Euro (1997 prices) per ton per year and the tax rate on NOx emissions 4860 (1997 prices) per ton per year (but revenues are refunded to liable plants in proportion to their energy production).
Several studies have evaluated the potential impact of the introduction of green tax reforms in Italy. To our knowledge all of them concentrated on taxes aimed at reducing CO 2 emissions. Most of them found that substantial reductions of carbon emission could be achieved at virtually not costs in terms of output and with some gains in terms of employment. Capros et al (1996) , use the European model GEM-E3 to simulate the introduction of the European carbon tax (corresponding approx to 24% of the price of oil). They observe a positive double dividend in all EU12 countries modelled. Benefits are higher in the UK and the Netherlands where labour markets are more competitive and lower in Italy, Spain and Greece.
Reduction of CO2 emissions achieved with positive effects on employment are also found in Pireddu (1994 and , who investigates the potential effect of the 'green tax reform' increasing by 10% the existing taxes on energy, and Marsiliani (1998) , who investigates the sensitivity of the double dividend to change in the degree of competition in the product and labour market.
Contrasting results are in Carraro, Galeotti and Gallo (1996) who simulate the introduction of a carbon tax following the EC proposal (Official Journal of the EC, 1992) in the WARM model. The revenue of the tax is used to lower payroll taxes. Results are qualitatively similar for all the European countries. In the short-run wages are reduced and employment increases. However, in the longer run (after 10 years), wages tend to revert to their baseline level and then to increase afterwards. The increase in households disposable income leads to an increase in consumption, including energy and therefore of emission levels. In order to investigate the introduction of green taxes in Italy, a single-country CGE model has been constructed. The initial interactions between economic activity and the environment -as captured by our model -are presented here below. From a static perspective, the top panel of Table 3 -1 depicts the estimates for the sectoral emission intensities for production in 1990, i.e. the volume of emissions per unit of output. The Italian economy has been disaggregated (for a summary presentation) into 8 macro sectors: agriculture (Agri), mining and other primary products (Mining), food products (FoodPr), textiles, highly polluting manufacturing (PollMan), other manufactured products (OthMan), polluting services (PollServ) and services with low rates of pollution (NPlServ).
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The last column displays economy-wide averages weighted by sectoral 20 Agriculture is an aggregate sector in the source Input Output table. Mining consists of coal, coke, oil and natural gas (an aggregate sector) plus non-metal and metal mining. Food products include 4 sub-sectors diary, meat, other food, and beverages and tobacco. Textiles are composed of textiles and clothing, and leather. Highly polluting manufacturing aggregates chemicals, oil refinery, iron and steel and metal production, equipment and machinery, rubber and plastic industries. Other manufacturing is composed of electrical durables, autos production, wood, and paper and print. outputs, the last three rows of the top panel show respectively per cent shares of sectoral production, export to output ratios, and sectoral employment shares of total employment. The bottom panel the row normalised emission coefficients: for each type of emission the sectoral coefficient is compared to the economy-wide average set equal to 100.
From this summary table, it is possible to observe the distribution of emissions intensities across sectors. This depends on the initial input-output structure of the Italian SAM (for the term α j C ij ) and on the vector of output (for the term β i X i Output ). A sector i would then have a higher pollution intensity (E/X i Output ) the more polluting intermediates it consumes and the higher the value of its own β i coefficient. By considering the relative weights shown in Table 3 -1 (last three rows), it is also possible to see which are the most polluting industries in volume terms and what might be the environmental consequences of changes in the labour factor use, or the employment effects originating from sectoral contraction due to green taxation Consider first pollution intensities. Excluding Mining, the aggregate PollMan records the worst case in terms of bio-accumulative substances, and toxic substances. A tax proportional to emission intensities will therefore result in higher production costs for this Polluting services are electricity production and distribution, and transport services. Non-polluting services are commerce, tourism, communication, banking and insurance, construction, and other services.
sector, which in the base year employs 7 per cent of the labour force. Conversely, a specifically targeted tax levied on SO2, NO2, CO and other water and air pollutants (VOC, PART, BOD, TSS) is likely to affect mostly the polluting services with more serious employment effects.
Although production activity is the dominant environmental agent in the economy, final consumption of goods and services can equally cause considerable pollution, especially for specific emission categories. Analogous results of emissions intensities for consumption are shown in Table 3 -2. These estimated intensities refer to consumption of final goods (and services) and do not consider households' waste. Except for water bioaccumulative, consumption generates emissions only in correspondence of polluting manufactured products, as in the case of consumption of refined fuels or chemicals. Bioaccumulative metals and toxic waste released through consumption, similarly to production, usually degrade soil. 
The Benchmark Scenario
The definition of a plausible evolution for the Italian economy is based on several simplifying hypotheses. The following simulations should therefore not be considered as a forecast exercise, for CGE models are not adequate forecasts tools. In fact, the definition of a growth path, supported by exogenous assumptions, serves the purpose of establishing a scenario with no policy interventions. Impacts of different economic policies are then evaluated against this reference scenario by measuring the variations in the economic aggregates. Fixing values for exogenous variables within a realistic confidence interval seems to imply no major consequences: the relative variations of the different economic aggregates measured during the evaluation of alternative policies with respect to the reference scenario seem uninfluenced by those a priori choices.
Growth hypotheses
Crucial growth rates have to be fixed in order to define the reference scenario. The GDP growth rate up to the year 2004 is exogenously determined so that the capital productivity growth rate can be estimated.
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A yearly average growth rate was estimated at 3.0 per cent, population and labour force are supposed to grow at the same exogenously fixed rate of 2 per cent per year.
A further hypothesis concerns the monetary transfers among agents in the economy and public expenditures. These are supposed to be growing at the same rate as GDP. The government budget surplus is assumed to decrease during the simulation period so that it reaches balance at the year 2010. The last hypothesis on exogenous growth rates assumes that the energy efficiency factor increases at a yearly rate of 1 per cent and labour productivity at 0.5 per cent. Apart from the latter assumptions about efficiency, no other modification affects the current technology.
However, this can become less polluting because of factors' substitution due to changes in tax structure, production and consumption. The remaining part of this section focuses on the joint evolution of Italian economic activity and pollution in the benchmark scenario.
Growth and emissions
The joint evolution of economic activity and emission volumes can be seen in Table  4 -1 where the long-term pollution elasticities with respect to production and consumption are depicted. These are measured as the ratio of the yearly average growth rates of polluting emissions to those of production (and consumption, during the period 1991 -2004) obtained in the benchmark scenario, i.e. without any policy change. Notice that aggregate pollution grows more or less at the same rate of economic activity, as the elasticities are very close to unity. In other words, given that output growth rate has been exogenously fixed at 3.0 per cent per year, without policy intervention, we expect this same rate (or a very close one) for the growth of the 13 pollutants considered.
In addition the relative weights of production and consumption generated emissions do not vary significantly during the simulation period.
The analysis of the decomposition of emission by origin can be instructive. Three types of effects are distinguished in the variation of emission levels: the composition effect takes into account the modification of the proportion of polluting products in the aggregate output; the technological effect reflects changes in pollution due to alteration in the production technology; the scale effect describes the impact of increased volumes of output on the environment.
Consider the following identity, which simply states that total emission (for each type of pollutant) is equal to the sum of sectoral emissions:
The total variation in emission levels can then be measured as the sum of the mentioned three effects by differentiating the shown identity: The determinants of variations in the levels of emissions due to changes in production or consumption vectors are displayed in Table 4 -2. Observing the values in the scale effect column, it clearly emerges that the predominant role in environmental degradation (across all types of emission) is played by the increase in activity volumes. The proportion of polluting goods and services produced and consumed expands from 1991 to 2004, thereby increasing, with the exception of sulphur, nitrogen and carbon oxides and other water and air emissions, the aggregate pollution volumes (composition effect). Finally, production technologies appear to be cleaner at the end of the period, specifically because of the improvements derived from the assumed gains in the energy efficiency 22 In this case, the technological effect is absent, given that each component of final consumption is associated to an emission coefficient invariant with time. The emission volumes variation due to a modified consumption vector takes the form: factor and from some substitution in production factors (technology effect). Bioaccumulative emissions are the exception, but register very low magnitudes. The actual mechanics of the technology effect deserve some additional elaboration. The production technology specification was briefly described in the previous section, but it is worthwhile highlighting again some of its important characteristics. In the current CGE model production technology is defined as a combination of intermediate inputs and primary factors. Some substitution among these two groups is possible, while intermediate inputs are combined among themselves in fixed proportions. The primary factor bundle is composed of three substitutable components: energy, capital and labour, with energy producing toxic emissions when used. Energy is furthermore decomposed in oil products and electricity, with each of them having different polluting characteristics. Therefore a producer may reduce its emissions at any of the described levels by substituting intermediates and factors, or by replacing energy with non-energy factors, or, finally, by switching among energy sources. Actual substitutions result from alterations in relative prices of the constituents (intermediates and factors), and relative prices are changed, among other things, by indirect tax variations. Even if this specification incorporates a quite complex adjustment process, it should be noticed that some important links between pollution and technology are not precisely taken into account. For instance, innovation or technology transfers, which may explain how substitution among factors and inputs can be realised, are not explicitly modelled.
Besides, emissions reduction, cleaning and other end-of-pipe techniques are not considered. The basic mechanism is governed by an endogenous response to changes in relative prices of factors/inputs and its flexibility is limited by empirical substitution elasticities.
In summary, with no policy intervention, economic activity growth results in a significant increment of emissions despite output and consumption shifts towards less polluting products and the implementation of cleaner technology.
Environmental Policy Scenarios
Having defined a 'Business as Usual' (BaU) base scenario, this section examines the interactions between environmental policy and the economy.
In the Environmental Policy Scenarios we consider a progressive reduction of each type of emission (i.e. it consists of 13 different experiments), as follows. Firstly, a target in terms of emissions abatement is exogenously fixed: emissions levels are reduced with respect to the reference scenario by 2 per cent in 1992, 8 per cent in 1998, 17 per cent in 2001 and 25 per cent in the end of the period. Secondly, the target is reached by imposing a uniform tax per unit of emission paid by the agent (consumers and producers) causing that pollution. For an exogenously assigned emission reduction rate in emission volumes, the model endogenously 23 calculates the tax rate. The result is analogous to the implementation of tradeable pollution rights where the equilibrium price of these rights is equal to the applied tax. In theory, a tax like ours, levied on the substance that is causing the environmental problem, is the most efficient. In practice, however, this is not always possible and taxes are levied on a proxy of the emission (like an input in the process/product -taxes on fuels -; or the of product itself, -tax on batteries), with a loss of efficiency. Therefore, in our case, the particular design of the tax may lead to an underestimation of the economic costs of the implementation of green taxes.
We consider two ways of recycling green tax revenues: in a first scenario (pure environmental policies) revenues are returned to households in proportion to their income tax rates; in a second scenario (co-ordinated environmental and labour policies) revenues are used to reduce wage taxes across sectors in a uniform way. In both cases, fiscal reforms are revenue-neutral, i.e. the government budget is left unchanged.
In order to render more legible our results presented in the following tables, emissions are aggregated into five groups: toxic pollutants (TOXAIR, TOXWAT, TOXSOL), bioaccumulative metals (BIOAIR, BIOWAT, BIOSOL), oxide emissions (SO 2 , NO 2 , CO), other air pollutants (VOC, PART) and other water pollutants (BOD, SS). These aggregations are consistent in physical terms and do not hide relative variations of opposite sign. In fact, emissions show a high correlation degree within each group. Table 5 -1 summarises the main results in terms of emission elasticities of the first group of simulations, when green tax revenues are returned to households in proportion to income tax. The figures in the table correspond to a percentage change in emission groups with respect to 1 per cent change in total production or consumption. The first row (BaU) shows for each emission group the elasticities of emissions with respect to gross output in the reference scenario, so that, for instance, average yearly growth rates for bioaccumulative emissions in the period 1991 -2004 in the reference case are estimated to be equal to 1.30 times the average growth rate for production. The 13 rows below the BaU scenario show the elasticities corresponding to the hypothetical implementation of a specific emission tax. For instance, if a uniform tax were levied on air pollutants (TOXAIR) so that 25 per cent abatement with respect to the benchmark were the target for the year 2004, average yearly growth rates for toxic emissions would be equal to 0.91 times the average growth rate for production. Or, considering consumption originated emissions, 0.92 times the corresponding growth rate for final demand.
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Pure Environmental Policies
The figures of Table 5 -1 show clearly that targeted emission taxes have considerable reduction effects. For each simulation, the elasticities of the targeted group (the boxes on the main diagonals of the table) of emission with respect to production are smaller than in the benchmark.
The figures of Table 5-1 show also that a specific abatement policy not only reduces its targeted toxic emissions but also those of other pollutants (the values outside the boxes on the main diagonals of the table). For instance, if a uniform tax were levied on air pollutants (TOXAIR) not only the elasticity of toxic pollutants would pass from 1.30 in the benchmark to 0.91, but also the elasticity of bio-accumulative metals with respect to production would be reduced from 1.30 to 0.76. The only exception is represented by the policies targeted at sulphur and nitrogen oxides: in this case a slight increase with respect to the benchmark is registered in the elasticities for Bio emissions and water pollutants. It appears that, in general, substitution effects among different types of emission are not induced in the production processes. This may be explained by two related facts: firstly specific intermediates (for example oil) are used in the production of most goods and generate emissions of most types, and secondly, given the Leontief structure of intermediate consumption no substitution is possible among them. Thus targeting a specific effluent has the connected beneficial effects of reducing other pollutants.
Aggregate reduction in the emission volumes is primarily the result of the decrease in production generated emissions. And this is due to a shift of production towards less polluting activities as well as, within each activity, to the implementation of cleaner technologies. Table 5 -2 shows an example of a detailed decomposition of the various reduction effects, contrasting the values for the benchmark (from Table 4 -2) with those for the toxair simulation. A significant lower output for those sectors producing highly polluting goods, up to 20 per cent with respect to the reference scenario in the final year account for a high share of total emission's reduction (composition effect). Emissions abatement in the other industries is also obtained through diminished pollution intensities (technology effect), as the result of substitution of toxic intermediates with more labour and capital and cleaner energy sources. Once the environmental effectiveness of the emission taxes has been shown, the next important question concerns their cost in terms of reduced economic growth. Table 5-3 shows average yearly growth rate of GDP in the benchmark and the 13 scenarios. It appears that the different progressive abatement policies examined have quite low costs in output terms. The average yearly GDP growth rate in the simulations is found in the range of 2.7 and 3.0 per cent, very close to the benchmark rate of 3.0 per cent. Employment effects are also negligible, as shown in Table 5 -4b below. This low cost may be explained by several related reasons. Firstly, as explained above, the composition effect plays an important role and even if certain sectors reduce considerably their output, and consequently their factor demands, other industries expand and take advantage of the non-polluting resources released by the contracting sectors. Moreover, these expanding activities may as well benefit from the assumed substitution possibilities between different inputs and factors, shifting their technologies towards cleaner input combinations, thus avoiding rising costs due to the emission taxes. 25 Secondly, the redistribution scheme of the emission tax revenue seems to almost cancel out the distortionary effect of these same taxes. It should be noticed that in the simulations with abatement policies, savings are higher, even in the current model with myopic agents who do not anticipate future emission taxes. This is due to the tax redistribution scheme. Revenues from emission taxes are redistributed to the households as a function of their income tax rates; 26 hence a large part of the increased government transfers they receive is saved. This results in larger investment possibilities and faster capital accumulation, a sort of double dividend effect. Besides new capital vintages enjoy larger production substitution elasticities helping the economy to adjust more quickly without compromising aggregate growth rates. Table 5 -4 summarises the main results for this second set of simulations, where green taxes revenues are used to reduce wage taxes across sectors in a uniform way so that the government budget is left unchanged (revenue neutrality is maintained). As in Table 5 -1 results are reported in terms of emission elasticities to production and final demand. It appears that recycling green tax revenue to reduce wage taxes greatly facilitates the adjustment process. As shown in the column 'Ave' in Table 5 -4 emission elasticities in this group of simulations are between 26 and 6 per cent lower than in the pure environmental policies simulations whose results are reported in Table 5 -1. Considerably lowered labour costs, in conjunction with more expensive polluting intense use of the polluting inputs. This, jointly with the other reasons exposed in the main text, explains why additional relative price distortions caused by emission taxes are not spread to too many sectors, and why aggregate growth is not affected in a remarkable way. 26 These are calculated from the base year SAM. 27 It should be noted that elasticities values for this BaU scenario are slightly different from those presented above. The reason for this discrepancy is that the model has to be recalibrated when the government budget is equilibrated via wage tax and direct tax adjustments, and the recalibration affects not only the simulation results but also the BaU scenario. In other words it would have been incorrect to compare experiment scenarios where the adjustment is through the two cited fiscal instruments to a BaU where adjustment is only achieved by altering direct taxes. material inputs (which now include the green tax), incentive firms to switch towards more labour intensive and cleaner production structures. As in the first set of simulation, a specific abatement policy not only reduces its targeted toxic emission but also those of other pollutants.
Co-ordinated environmental and labour policies
"Co-ordinated environmental and labour policies" scenarios show considerably better results with respect to "pure environmental policies" also in terms of employment. Table 5 -5 shows the differential effect of revenue recycling on labour demand, the first row displays percent changes of labour demand when the recycling mechanism involves reductions in the wage tax, whereas the second row presents the same changes when green taxes revenues are exclusively used to reduce direct taxes. The values shown in the table are labour demand's percentage differences between final years of the experiments and final year of the benchmark scenario. In the co-ordinated environmental and labour policies case a small employment double dividend is achieved in most of the 13 simulation exercise. Reducing fiscal distortion against the use of labour facilitates the adjustment of the economy to the new equilibrium with the green taxes: employment increases and emission elasticities are reduced. 
Conclusion
This paper investigates the potential of a comprehensive green tax reform in Italy. The country is particularly interesting because it shows a relatively high-energy efficiency, so that standard command-and-control measures risk to be extremely costly in reducing energy-related emissions. The use of economic instruments is also useful in targeting other sources of pollution, such as traffic and the use of phosphate and nitrogen in agriculture, where Italy scores relatively worse than most European countries.
While previous studies only simulated the introduction of taxes on CO 2 emission, this paper simulates results for emission taxes targeted to other sources of pollution. It is shown that the introduction of a tax targeted to one single pollutant, also decrease the elasticities of emission to increase in production for other pollutants. Major potential benefits are therefore to be expected from the design of a comprehensive fiscal reform that takes into account spillover effects.
The effect of the introduction of environmental taxes together with the lowering of labour taxation is also investigated. Currently, the high level of taxation on labour participates to sustain a very high unemployment rate and low job creation rate. The reduction of labour costs through reduction of taxation on labour without compromising the government budget would be extremely advantageous. Previous studies on green tax reform shows results for Italy in line with what obtained for other European countries, and generally a small positive double dividend in term of employment creation is found. This paper confirms the positive double dividend.
Two remarks have to be made. Firstly, in our model green taxes are paid in proportion to the emissions of polluting substances. In practice, this is not always possible and often a proxy of the emission has to be taxed, implying a loss of efficiency. Therefore, our results may underestimate the economic costs of achieving a given emission reduction target. Secondly, the positive employment double dividend is obtained on a competitive labour market, where reduction of wage taxes allow a reduction of labour costs and are not eroded in the bargaining process by increases in net wages. This assumptions is likely to lead to optimistic results especially in the Italian case, where unions coverage (the extent to which contracts signed by organised unions extend to the rest of the country) and unions' density (the number of organised unions member net of pensioners divided by the labour force) are both high in comparison with other OECD countries 28 , as it is the case with other continental European countries such as France and Germany.
Research agenda for the future include the design of a integrated fiscal reform for the actual fiscal system with the introduction of non-compliance, enforcement costs and tax evasion and the introduction of bargaining in the modelling of the wage formation process.
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